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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Alyssa Jeanne Bonini 
 
Master of Science 
 
Conflict and Dispute Resolution Program 
 
June 2018 
 
Title: The Hammer and the Hand: Pluralistic Groundwater Governance and Conflict 
Transformation in Oregon’s Malheur Lake Basin 
 
This thesis examines place-based water resources planning in Oregon’s Malheur 
Lake Basin and analyzes the extent to which pluralistic governance has the capacity to 
transform conflict in groundwater governance regimes. It provides a qualitative analysis 
of current literature on groundwater governance and uses process tracing to extract best 
practices from three case studies to identify best practices in pluralistic groundwater 
governance specifically as they apply to the Malheur Lake Basin. Findings suggest that in 
addition to a pluralistic governance structure composed of community-based processes 
and state-based enforcement mechanisms, conflict transformation is the most appropriate 
lens through which to address groundwater conflicts and disputes and should be an 
integral component of groundwater governance structures. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Groundwater. The mysterious and occult1 resource that seventy percent of 
Oregonians rely upon as their primary source of fresh water.2 Out of the 2.5 million acre 
feet (AF)3 of groundwater pumped annually across the state, the majority is put to 
consumptive use, with ninety percent used for agricultural purposes.4 And yet much of 
groundwater pumped annually goes unregulated and unrecorded by the state.5  
 Harney County is located in southeastern Oregon and relies heavily on 
groundwater from the Malheur Lake Basin to support its rural agricultural economy. 
Groundwater from the Basin’s aquifers is used primarily for irrigation and stock 
watering, although the highly lucrative business of growing water-intensive crops has 
prompted many ranchers in the area to trade in their cattle for alfalfa seed.6 However, as 
more people begin growing water intensive crops in arid high-desert country, some older, 
shallower pumps are running dry. The increasing frequency and duration of drought in 
                                               
1 Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, Inc, 42 Tx. Sup. Ct. J. 629 (1999). 
 
2 OREGON DEP’T OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OREGON PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS GROUNDWATER 
RESOURCE GUIDE 2 (Oct. 2017). 
 
3 OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEP’T, WATER RIGHTS IN OREGON 2 (Nov. 2013) (noting “[o]ne (1) acre-
foot is the volume of water that will cover one acre to a depth of one foot and is equal to . . . 43,560 cubic 
feet [or] 325,851 gallons). 
 
4 Memorandum from Justin Iverson, Groundwater Section Manager, and Brenda Bateman, Technical 
Services Division Administrator to Oregon Water Resources Commission 3 (Oct. 13, 2016) (on file with 
author)(reporting that of the 2.5 million AF of groundwater pumped annually in Oregon, “90 percent is 
used for irrigation, five percent for municipal and community supply, three percent for domestic use, and 
the remaining two percent for other permitted and exempt uses.”). 
 
5 BARTON THOMPSON, JR. JOHN LESHY, & ROBERT ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES, 459 
(West, 5th ed. 2013) (discussing the tendency of groundwater users to resist well registration requirements 
out of fear that a reported well will be monitored and eventually regulated by the State). 
 
6 Kelly House & Mark Graves, Draining Oregon, THE OREGONIAN, 4 (Aug. 26, 2016), 
http://media.oregonlive.com/environment_impact/other/Draining_Oregon_0826d.pdf. 
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recent years has simultaneously contributed to an increased demand for groundwater to 
offset the effects of dry streambeds. 
Despite the high rate of groundwater consumption within the Malheur Lake 
Basin, the most recent groundwater study of the Basin was conducted by the United 
States Geological Survey (USGS) in 1968 and provides little insight to the current 
location or quantity of groundwater in the Basin.7 This lack of current data paired with an 
increased demand for groundwater supplies to meet population growth is resulting in 
groundwater security concerns relating to the quality and quantity of the resource.8 Such 
insecurity is magnified by climate change and poses catastrophic consequences, 
particularly for rural agricultural communities reliant on ancient groundwater, or “fossil 
water” pumped from deeper, confined aquifers.9 Critical voids in current groundwater 
data and perceived legal barriers to conservation create an existential conundrum for the 
Basin: how do water users ensure that existing and future needs are met without 
exceeding the quantity of water the Basin can provide? 
Concerned by increasing drought frequency, duration, and intensity, the Harney 
Watershed Council applied for a grant from the Oregon Water Resources Department 
(OWRD) in 2016, which selected the Malheur Lake Basin as one of four pilot basins to 
undertake a four-to five year long place-based integrated water planning initiative 
                                               
7 Id. at 10. 
 
8 UN Water, “What is Water Security.” Infographic. May 8, 2013 (illustrating that groundwater insecurity 
refers to a community’s capacity to access and protect water to sustain human life and livelihoods). 
 
9 OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY, Groundwater and Aquifers (2018) 
http://wellwater.oregonstate.edu/groundwater-and-aquifers (documenting that aquifers in Oregon are made 
out of either basalt, sand and gravel, or out of bedrock). 
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recommended in Oregon’s 2012 Integrated Water Resources Strategy (IWRS). The 
locations of each of the four pilot basins are provided by Figure 1 below. 10  
 
Figure 1: Place-Based Water Planning Pilots 
With support from the OWRD, participants in the Malheur Lake Basin’s 
Community-Based Water Planning (CBWP) pilot are collaborating on voluntary, place-
based integrated water resources planning which necessitates a strong groundwater 
governance structure for the Basin. 
 Whereas management refers to discrete actions taken, governance refers to the 
overarching framework that facilitates decision-making processes that set the stage for 
specific management actions. A strong governance foundation is a critical element for 
addressing water security, in which scarcity a symptom of poor governance.11 In essence, 
management provides the ends, while governance provides the means.12 To this end, the 
Malheur Lake Basin CBWP is a catalyst for groundwater governance between local 
stakeholders and state water regulators by helping communities devise and implement 
                                               
10 OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEP’T, PLACE-BASED PLANNING UPDATES JULY – DEC. 2016 1 (2016), 
http://www.oregon.gov/owrd/docs/Place/UpdatesHandout_DEC2016_PBP_2017JAN01_FINAL.pdf. 
 
11 K.G. Villholth & K. Conti, Groundwater Governance: Rationale, Definition, Current State and Heuristic 
Framework, in ADVANCES IN GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE 3, 4 (Karen Villholth et al. eds., 2017). 
 
12 Id. at 11. 
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pluralistic governance procedures for voluntary, community-lead water management 
strategies in areas with unique water challenges.13  
 The term “pluralism” in this context refers to de-centralized governance structures 
which span horizontally rather than vertically between state-level government and local 
communities.14 Derived from scholarship in the political sciences, the pluralization of 
governance creates a structure that is capable of quickly responding to change by 
speeding up decision-making and implementation processes by reducing pressure on the 
state and building governance capacity at a community level.15  
 The concept of plural groundwater governance can be effectively described by the 
following metaphor: Just as the hammer is only as strong as the hand that wields it, so are 
state water regulations effective only to the extent that they align with community values.  
 
Figure 2: The Hammer and the Hand of Pluralistic Governance 
Similarly, the community hand, being more in touch with local needs, values, and 
conflicts, is well-equipped to produce an enduring governance structure when it works in 
                                               
13 OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEP’T., OREGON’S 2017 INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES STRATEGY 115 
(2017). 
 
14 Aditi Mukherji & Tushaar Shah, Groundwater Socio-Ecology and Governance: A Review of Institutions 
and Policies in Selected Countries, 13 Hydrogeology Journal 328, 339 (2005). 
 
15 Id. 
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concert with the hammer represented by state enforcement. This pluralistic governance 
embodied by the OWRD’s place-based planning initiative, like the hammer and the hand 
has the potential to build a groundwater governance structure in the Malheur Lake Basin 
that reflects community values and wields the regulatory strength of the State. This thesis 
evaluates the CBWP in the Malheur Lake Basin and proposes that pluralistic groundwater 
governance can serve as a robust mechanism for water security through long-term and 
positive change as seen through the lens of conflict transformation. 
 Part I of this thesis provides a background on various geological and legal forces 
impacting groundwater in the Malheur Lake Basin and introduces the Basin’s place-
based planning pilot. Part II reviews water law as the “hammer” of top-down, regulatory 
groundwater governance, while Part III reviews the “hand” of bottom-up, community-
based groundwater governance. Part IV addresses the integration of state- and local-level 
groundwater governance regimes in the Basin and proposes that such a pluralistic 
governance structure can transform conflict into opportunity for positive change as 
prescribed by Lederach’s conflict transformation framework. This proposition is 
supported by a comparative analysis of three different groundwater governance strategies 
adopted by agricultural communities in Kansas, Colorado and Utah that are experiencing 
groundwater scarcity due to climate change and high agricultural demand. Part V 
concludes with recommendations for how the Malheur Lake Basin can use the pluralistic 
groundwater governance approach embodied by the place based planning program as a 
foundation for transforming barriers into opportunities for future groundwater security in 
the Basin.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGIES 
 While a robust literature exists on natural resource governance models 
encouraging public engagement there is a notable gap in scholarship on conflict 
transformation and pluralistic groundwater governance in the American West. Indeed, 
much of the literature on groundwater governance in the American West that more 
closely matched the legal and cultural landscape of the Malheur Lake Basin addressed 
groundwater conflict as an issue in need of resolution or as a problem that could be fixed 
by the right market, pipeline, or attorney. Even Oregon’s Integrated Water Resources 
Strategy, from which the place-based integrated water planning process applied in the 
Malheur Lake Basin arises, emphasizes conflict resolution in its implementation 
guidelines.16 This is compelling because water is by its very nature a dynamic and 
constantly changing resource. It is moreover an emotionally charged resource because of 
how people identify with water.  
 The methodologies employed in this thesis consisted interdisciplinary research 
and qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources relating to diverse approaches 
to groundwater management and governance. Much of what was found included case 
studies conducted across Asia and northern Africa which drew comparisons between 
                                               
16 See Figure 8, infra 28. 
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community-based groundwater governance and instances where the state or national 
government exercised its power over the resource.17  
 Additionally, process tracing was used to identify and analyze best practices from 
three case studies discussed in Chapter VI. The process tracing methodology determined 
whether a case study was sufficiently similar to the Malheur Lake Basin by identifying 
parallels in water law, climate, dominant industry, and historic use of water. While 
California boasts what is arguably the most robust legal and regulatory framework for 
groundwater management in the United States, the state applies a mixed or “hybrid” of  
prior appropriation and riparian doctrines to allocate water resources.18 Despite 
regulatory similarities between Oregon and California, the applicable legal doctrines 
differed substantially. The California model of groundwater governance and management 
therefore fell outside of the scope of this study.  
 Although the pluralistic governance structure provided by the place-based water 
planning Draft Guidelines provides for flexibility of governance, this thesis proposes that 
conflict resolution is too linear and rigid a process to created strong groundwater 
governance structures, and therefore evaluates groundwater governance through the lens 
of conflict transformation as devised by pioneering scholar, John Paul Lederach. 
Lederach’s framework is unique to the extent it considers conflict not as an undesired 
state to be avoided, but as an ongoing, inevitable process to be used to achieve positive 
change.  
                                               
17 See generally Asma Yaqoob, Mutual Vulnerability in the Indus Basin (Regional Center for Strategic 
Studies, 2013) (exploring integrated water security as a conflict transformation strategy to bring about 
peace in the Indus Basin). 
18  THOMPSON et al., supra note 5 at 200. 
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 Although conflict transformation is more commonly applied to interpersonal 
social conflicts and conceptually in peace studies, Lederach’s framework provides an 
appropriate lens through which to evaluate pluralistic groundwater governance in the 
Malheur Lake Basin because it provides the flexibility required by water resources 
governance and management. To this end, additional scholarship on the transformative 
potential of pluralistic groundwater governance between local stakeholders and the state 
could be helpful for groups like the Malheur Lake Basin CBWP that will be expected to 
maintain water governance structures after the original legislation is repealed in July, 
2019.19 
                                               
19 OR SB 266 (2015) §3(2) (confirming that “the repeal of Section 2 of this Act [on July 1, 2019] does not 
affect any rights or responsibilities established in a grant, contract or agreement made under Section 2 of 
this 2015 Act prior to July 1, 2019”). 
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CHAPTER III 
THE MALHEUR LAKE BASIN: FORCES AT WORK 
The Malheur Lake Basin is an endorheic, or internally-draining basin that is 
composed of seven distinct sub-basins.20 Each of these sub-basins has limited 
groundwater supplies stored in confined and unconfined aquifers that are separated 
vertically by layers of impermeable material such as clay.21  
 
Figure 3: Sub-Basins Within Malheur Lake Basin 
Groundwater supplies in the Malheur Lake Basin’s unconfined, shallow aquifers 
recharges primarily from percolating rain and snowfall in the Basin’s highlands.22 These 
                                               
20 ESTHER LEV, JOHN BAUER, JOHN CHRISTY, OREGON CLOSED LAKES BASIN WETLAND CONSERVATION 
PLAN 3 (Portland State Univ. 2012) http://wetlandsconservancy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Oregon-
Closed-Lakes-Basin-Wetland-Conservation-Plan-June-2012.pdf. (describing an endorheic basin as one 
whose waters drain internally through evapotranspiration or percolation to the underlying aquifer.) 
 
21 United States Geologic Survey (citing Piper, et al.), Groundwater Study Area of Concern Presentation 
(Jul. 18, 2017), 
http://www.oregon.gov/owrd/docs/Place/Malheur_Lake_Basin/GWSAC_Presentation_2017JUL18_USGS
_PreviousStudies.pdf. 
 
22 A.R. Leonard, Groundwater Resources in Malheur Lake Basin, Harney County, Oregon, STATE OF 
OREGON 25-26 (Nov. 1970). 
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are confined by the saturated water table above and recharge primarily by way of waters 
percolating from the surface.23 The Basin’s confined aquifers, on the other hand, recharge 
by way of percolation from the overlying water table and unconfined aquifers. This 
recharge is extremely slow due to the aquifer’s confinement.24 Figure 3 below illustrates 
the recharge and extraction processes for confined and unconfined aquifers:25 
 
Figure 4: Confined and Unconfined Aquifer Diagram 
 Wells in the Malheur Lake Basin extract groundwater from both confined and 
unconfined aquifers. Unlike water diverted from the surface horizontally, groundwater is 
pumped vertically from a water table which, if depleted too quickly, will decline beyond 
the reach of shallow pumps – similar to the effect that multiple straws have in a 
                                               
23 See generally Thomas Harter, Reference: Groundwater Quality and Groundwater Pollution 3 UNIV. 
CAL. DAVIS (2003) (explaining how surface water percolation can contaminate the aquifer below with 
foreign bacteria and chemicals from human activities). 
 
24 Howard Perlman, Aquifers and Groundwater, UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
https://water.usgs.gov/edu/earthgwaquifer.html (last visited May 14, 2018). 
 
25 OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEP’T, WATER WELL OWNER’S HANDBOOK 1 (Jun. 2015), 
http://www.oregon.gov/owrd/pubs/docs/Well_Water_Handbook.pdf. 
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milkshake. This effect, results a “cone of depression” which is illustrated in Figure 5 
below. 26 
 
 
Figure 5: Pumping Effects on Water Table 
 As illustrated above, when a well punctures an aquifer the groundwater 
surrounding the well changes its directional path towards the point of extraction. This 
directional change can result in a cone of depression surrounding the pump which draws 
groundwater away from other neighboring pumps and may cause some to go dry in 
places where the water table has substantially declined. Over-extraction of groundwater 
from unconfined aquifers can also have an effect on surface water supplies, which may 
interfere with legal rights to the surface. 
 While groundwater extraction from a unconfined aquifers bears a higher risk 
surface water right interference, water extracted from confined aquifers, or “fossil water” 
is less likely to have an immediate, adverse impact on surface supplies. Because negative 
effects of groundwater extraction are less noticeable on the surface, the OWRD has 
historically approved permits for wells pumping from confined aquifers, since 
                                               
26 PAST-PRESENT-FUTURE, https://past-present-future.weebly.com/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2018). 
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consumptive use of fossil water is less likely to result in immediate harm to prior surface 
rights.27 This practice of approving new wells in confined aquifers originates in large part 
from limited data on the Basin’s groundwater, as it is difficult if not impossible to 
effectively regulate a resource that has not been measured.28  
 Although no longer mysterious or occult, the relative lack of data on Malheur 
Lake Basin’s groundwater has severely handicapped governance and management 
responses to scarcity by creating a lack of awareness and understanding.29 The acclaimed 
Oregonian series “Draining Oregon” highlighted this decades-long practice at the OWRD 
of approving new water permits and certificates despite a substantial data gap 
surrounding the effects that existing pumps have on groundwater supplies and the Basin’s 
water system as a whole.30 This is particularly significant given the contingency of 
permits on whether the proposed groundwater use would exceed the annual recharge of 
the water table or interfere with surface stream flows when added to existing groundwater 
                                               
27 House & Graves, supra note 6. 
 
28 WILLIAM ALLEY & ROSEMARY ALLEY, HIGH AND DRY 246 (YALE UNIV. PRESS. 2017). In order to close 
the data gap, the OWRD has encouraged the drilling of observation wells to collect data on current 
groundwater levels that will help inform the permit administration process. However, observations wells 
are few and far between, and typically exist in areas with known groundwater problems, rather than 
collecting a balanced, statewide dataset. House & Graves  supra note 6 at 10, 22, 30. 
 
29 Villholth, supra note 11 at 17 (observing “[l]ack of awareness and understanding of groundwater issues 
leads to absence of a sense of urgency and forms . . . a key obstacle to the development of leadership and 
commitment to effective groundwater governance.”). See also Robert Varady, et al., Modes and 
Approaches of Groundwater Governance: A survey of Lessons Learned from Selected Cases Across the 
Globe, 8 WATER 417, 419 (SEPT. 23, 2016) (describing a recent shift in small-scale, institutional water 
management to broad-scale, multi-elemental governance). 
 
30 House & Graves, supra note 6. 
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uses.31 The exposé generated public concern that the OWRD is willfully blinding itself to 
the reality of water scarcity.32  
A. State Regulatory Response to Scarcity 
 In response to reports of dry wells and criticism that the OWRD was allocating 
more water than the Basin could naturally provide, the OWRD designated the Greater 
Harney Valley Groundwater Area of Concern (GHVGAC) in 2016.33 That same year, the 
United States Geological Survey (USGS) initiated a groundwater study of the Basin that 
will continue until 2020. Furthermore, the OWRD has placed a moratorium on new well 
permits in the Basin – with the exception of statutorily exempt uses34 – until the study’s 
completion, since the lack of data on groundwater use and increased demand for 
groundwater raises concerns about the quality and quantity of the resource.35 
 These state-level regulations come as good news for senior water rights holders 
and individuals concerned about water supply in the Basin. However, arguments exist 
that such regulations may restrict economic growth in the Basin, giving rise to concerns 
regarding the power of the state over what some view as more of a proprietary interest in, 
                                               
31 RICK BASTASCH, THE OREGON WATER HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO WATER AND WATER MANAGEMENT 83 
(OR. State Univ. Press 1998). 
 
32 Andrew Theen, Draining Oregon: 1 Year Later, State Still Treading Water with Little Changes, 
OREGONLIVE, (Sept. 5 2017), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2017/09/draining_oregon_1_year_later_s.html. (In 
response to concern generated by the article, Governor Kate Brown assured the public that legislator and 
stakeholder engagement is imperative to ensuring Oregon has a sustainable water future). 
 
33 OR. ADMIN. R. 690-512-0010, 20 (2016). See Douglas MacDougal, Consensus and Conflict in Oregon’s 
Troubled Waters – A Tale of Four Basins, MARTENLAW, (Feb. 22, 2016), 
https://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20160222-consensus-conflict-oregon-basins. 
 
34 OR. REV. STAT.537.545. 
 
35 Harney County Watershed Council, Groundwater Investigation, HARNEY COUNTY WATERSHED 
COUNCIL, http://hcwatershedcouncil.com/groundwater-investigation/ (last visited Jun. 6, 2018). 
 
  
14 
if not a right to the Basin’s subterranean waters.36 While western water law has indeed 
evolved under the umbrella of property rights, as the forthcoming section explains, the 
right is not to the resource itself but rather is a right to use the resource to the extent 
allowed by the state. The role of the state as the steward of water and of citizens as its 
users further emphasizes the importance of a pluralistic groundwater governance 
structure that minimizes the strength that the state regulatory hammer and gives 
communities a degree of agency over their water futures. 
B. Conflict Transformation: A Lens of Assessment 
 Conflict scholar, John Paul Lederach defines conflict transformation as a 
framework which focuses “on creating adaptive responses to human conflict through 
change processes which increase justice and reduce violence.”37 Like groundwater, 
conflict transformation is not static but is constantly moving, evolving, and adapting to 
changing circumstances. Assessing pluralism the Malheur Lake Basin CBWP through the 
lens of conflict transformation is therefore fitting because the framework is as dynamic a 
process as groundwater is a resource. 
While water conflicts can involve direct disputes between diametrically opposed 
parties, water conflict in the Malheur Lake Basin stems from the reality that more 
groundwater permits have been allocated and for a greater quantity of water than the 
Basin can naturally sustain. This is not an isolated conflict between a handful of 
                                               
36 Despite the almost ubiquitous transition of groundwater allocation from the doctrine of “absolute 
ownership” to “prior appropriation,” ongoing constitutional challenges to state stewardship of groundwater 
indicates an enduring proprietary understanding of groundwater resources. See Stefano Burchi, Legal 
Principals and Legal Frameworks Related to Groundwater, in ADVANCES IN GROUNDWATER 
GOVERNANCE, 119, 121-122 (Karen Villholth et al. eds., 2017). 
 
37 JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, THE LITTLE BOOK OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 22 (2003). 
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interested parties, but rather a systemic conflict that is made better or worse depending on 
variations in climate and demand. It is therefore helpful to evaluate the Malheur Lake 
Basin CBWP through Lederach’s lens of conflict transformation, which provides a 
framework for looking at conflict both episodically and dynamically.  
1. Intersecting Change Processes, Relational Context and 
Opportunity 
Fundamental to Lederach’s concept of conflict transformation are “creative 
change processes” which function as vehicles for progress within a conflict.38 Whereas 
the commonly cited process of conflict resolution focuses on the problem by providing a 
method of bringing an undesired conflict to an end by finding a solution, Lederach 
suggests that conflict transformation seeks to understand conflict holistically “as an 
opportunity to engage a broader context, [and] to explore and understand the system of 
relationships and patterns” involved.39 Change processes interact with relational contexts 
and the ability of those involved to view conflict as an opportunity for positive, rather 
than destructive change. Conflict transformation is found where these three fundamental 
elements coincide, illustrated by Figure 6 below: 
                                               
38 Id. at 19, 23-27. 
 
39 Id. at 30. 
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Figure 6: Conflict Transformation Intersection 
  
 The effects of change processes can be either specific or broad and can include 
processes generated by the conflict that are then altered to facilitate positive change. They 
also include processes that are initiated during the transformational process, the effects of 
which help conflict progress in a constructive direction. 
 The context of relationships between the diverse interests involved in conflict is 
vital to encouraging positive potential that Lederach views as inherent to all conflict.40 In 
order to build the capacity of participants to understand conflict as a positive force, the 
less visible dimensions of the relationship must be focused upon in addition to the context 
and substance of those relationships. The capacity of people to understand conflict as an 
unavoidable part of life that creates the potential for constructive change is fundamental 
to the idea of conflict transformation, and this includes a willingness of participants to 
respond to obstacles or setbacks in ways that maximize potential for positive change. 
                                               
40 Id. at 17. 
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2. Change as a Circle 
 Ledearach continues with the view of conflict as an ongoing process by 
illustrating its transformative lifecycle as a circle. The circle in this context represents 
that social change does not necessarily move at the same pace, nor does it move in one 
singular direction.41 The cyclical process of conflict transformation is illustrated below 
and provides a flexible, cyclical framework that facilitates transformative governance.42 
 
Figure 7: Lederach's Change as a Circle 
 The Place-based water planning processes in the Malheur Lake Basin could be 
greatly enhanced after the project’s expiration through engaging Basin stakeholders in a 
progressive, procedural cycle of issue identification, collaboration, accomplishment, and 
reevaluation as illustrated in Lederach’s depiction of “change as a circle.” Viewing 
groundwater governance as a circle of change that it rooted in collaboration between the 
hammer of state regulation and the hand of locally devised governance regimes rather 
                                               
41 Id. at 41. 
 
42 Id. at 42; Conflict Transformation, FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION BLOG (Apr. 2, 2013), 
https://forgivenessandreconciliation.wordpress.com/2013/04/02/289/. 
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than in a definite end-goal, the structure of groundwater governance in the Malheur Lake 
Basin will be foundationally much more resilient to external threats than it would be 
otherwise. This is due in part to the fact that local governance tends to more accurately 
reflect local circumstances.43  
 In contrast to the rigidity of traditional legal and regulatory governance and 
management frameworks which place a premium on conflict prevention and resolution, 
conflict transformation proposes a governance framework that is continuous, flexible and 
adaptive to changing circumstances. The following sections will be observed through the 
lens of conflict transformation. 
 
                                               
43 Megdal et al., Innovative Approaches to Collaborative Groundwater Governance in the United States: 
Case Studies from Three High-Growth Regions in the Sun Belt, 59 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 718, 
721 (2017). 
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CHAPTER IV 
TOP-DOWN GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE AS A “HAMMER”: 
OREGON’S LEGAL AND REGULATORY TOOLKIT 
 The post-war advent of inexpensive pump technology which came about in the 
1950s gave farmers access to groundwater and enabled them to irrigate crops and stock 
miles away from any surface water source or federal distribution project.44 However, 
such advances in pump technology have necessitated a more prominent role for the state 
government in regulating and managing groundwater supplies.45 In the United States, the 
federal government regulates water quality while the regulation of quantity falls to the 
states. Because the Oregon retains legal ownership of water resources, it also retains the 
authority to regulate those resources.46  
A. Governing Oregon’s Water Resources  
The doctrine of prior appropriation is the dominant legal framework used to 
allocate water in the arid states west of the Mississippi River. Based on the Gold-Rush 
era notion of “first in time, first in right,” prior appropriation fulfills water rights in the 
order in which they were obtained, giving those with senior rights priority over juniors 
during times of shortage.47 While gold and mineral prospectors in Colorado and 
                                               
44 See THOMPSON et al., supra note 5. 
 
45 VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS 20 (S. End Press 2002) (noting that “[a]s new technologies displace 
self-management systems, people’s democratic management structures deteriorate and their role in 
conservation shrinks.”) 
 
46 S.S. Sugg & E. Schlager, Participation of Stakeholders and Citizens in Groundwater Management: The 
Role of Collective Action, in ADVANCES IN GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE 137, 138 (Karen Villholth et al. 
eds., 2017).   
 
47 See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 4 NAT’L RESOURCES JOURNAL 
769-793, 770 REGENTS UNIV. (2001). See also ANDREAS N. CHARALAMBOUS, Transferable groundwater 
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California established usufructory or “use-based” rights to water under customary law, 
most western states today have adopted prior appropriation administers through a permit 
system.48  
In Oregon, permits for both surface water and groundwater are allocated 
according to priority and are administered by the Oregon Water Resources Department 
(OWRD).49 Under Oregon’s 1909 Water Code, a surface water right is legally attached to 
the land and requires the right holder to use the entirety of their water right for a 
beneficial use that is not wasteful.50 Once applicants have obtained a certificated water 
right, they may only lawfully cease beneficial use of their full right under exigent 
circumstances such as drought or financial hardship. During times of scarcity when water 
is unavailable to fulfill every water right, senior right holders to surface water may 
                                                                                                                                            
rights: Integrating Hydrogeology, Law and Economics 63-64 (ROUTLEDGE, 2013) (providing a brief history 
of the cultural context giving birth to the prior appropriation doctrine). 
 
48 OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEP’T, WATER RIGHTS IN OREGON: AN INTRODUCTION TO OREGON’S 
WATER LAWS 5 (Nov. 2003). Every western state except Colorado allocates water rights through state-based 
permit systems that have the plenary police power to oversee the creation, transfer, and enforcement of new 
and existing water rights.  
 
49 See JANET NEUMAN, OREGON WATER LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATER AND 
WATER RIGHTS IN OREGON 24 (Janet Neuman, ed., 2011) (describing that the “Oregon Doctrine” is a term 
used to refer to states whose water allocation laws began under the common law riparian doctrine and then 
transitioned to a prior appropriation system. Because Europeans settled in the wetter, western part of 
Oregon first before moving East to the more arid reaches of the state, the State’s waters were first managed 
under riparianism before transitioning into the prior appropriation system of management to accommodate 
more arid environments). 
 
50 OR. REV. STAT. 537.525 (3); Water may be used in Oregon for any use deemed “beneficial” under 
Oregon law. Such uses include but are not limited to: domestic water supply, fishing, industrial water 
supply, boating, irrigation, water contact recreation, livestock watering, aesthetic quality, fish and aquatic 
life, hydropower, wildlife and hunting, commercial navigation and transportation. OREGON DEP’T OF 
ENVIR. QUALITY, Beneficial Uses of Oregon’s Waters, http://www.oregon.gov/deq/wq/Pages/WQ-
Standards-Uses.aspx (last visited Feb. 06, 2018). 
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effectively “call the river,” forcing upstream junior rights holders to close their headgates 
to ensure that the senior right is satisfied first.51  
While the scramble for gold has invariably been replaced by the need for water as 
a commodity itself, the prior appropriation doctrine has evolved only slightly to cope 
with rising demand. Prior appropriation was designed specifically to manage water 
scarcity in the arid North American frontier and has generally been successful in that 
capacity, but some question the doctrine’s continued relevance in the modern era of 
climate change and water scarcity.52 Specifically, arguments against the use of prior 
appropriation as a groundwater allocation doctrine include that it promotes inequality and 
conflict between senior and junior rights holders, rural and urban populations, and 
environmental and agricultural uses.53  
In contrast to surface water which has a ubiquitous visual presence, groundwater 
is relatively invisible and was once considered so mysterious and unknown that it was 
effectively beyond the reach of the law to regulate.54 Increased and unregulated access to 
groundwater prompted the Oregon Legislature to pass the Groundwater Act in 1955 (the 
Act) which declared groundwater, like surface water, a public resource held in trust by 
                                               
51 J. David Aiken, The Use of Equitable Principles to Resolve “New” Western Water Disputes, in WATER 
ON THE GREAT PLAINS 54,56 (Peter Longo & David Yoskowitz, eds., 2002) (nothing the entitlement of 
senior appropriators to claim water even at the expense of juniors unless that junior is located downstream 
because the water would have effectively already passed by the senior). 
 
52 Id. at 54 (noting that “[p]rior appropriation has worked well in that it provides clear rules for resolving 
conflicts to use over-appropriated western streams.”) However, critics point out that PA “is inflexible, and 
gives an unfair advantage to [senior] users.” (Id at 55); See also A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: 
Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric? 76 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REV. 881-910, 883 (2000) (arguing that the doctrine 
of prior appropriation finds more power in the threat of its application than in the application of the rule 
itself). 
 
53 BASTASCH, supra note 31 at 301. See generally Charles Wilkinson, Aldo Leopold and Western Water 
Law: Thinking Perpendicular to the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, 24 LAND AND WATER LAW REV. 1 
(1989) (proposing an alternative to the classic doctrine of prior appropriation for allocating western waters). 
 
54 Sipriano, supra note 1.  
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the state and allocated by permit according to priority.55 Prior to the Act, prospective 
groundwater users were not required to obtain a permit at all before using the 
subterranean waters and could therefore exploit groundwater supplies regardless of the 
potential or actual harm caused to other users.56 While rights to groundwater that 
predated the Act were grandfathered into the new permit system, individuals wishing to 
attain a groundwater right subsequent to the Act’s passage were required to apply for a 
permit, with priority favoring the senior user. 
 Notably, the Act provided certain exemptions under which an appropriator is not 
required to obtain a permit.57 The exempt well provision was intended to reduce agency 
backlog in the permitting process by exempting domestic and other uses under 15,000 
gallons per day that were considered minimal and do not weigh heavily on the capacity of 
the aquifer.58 However, the provision has drawn criticism that the absence of a permitting 
requirement for exempt wells has resulted in a substantial data gap on the quantity and 
quality of groundwater throughout the state.59  
 The debate on exempt wells also indicates persevering attitudes towards 
groundwater rights as more of a proprietary “stick in the bundle” of property rights, 
rather than a usufructory right to a common resource.60 Such a proprietary stake in a 
                                               
55 Id. at  24. 
 
56 Id. 
 
57 OR. REV. STAT.537.545 (2015). 
 
58 Id. 
 
59 See Neuman, supra note 49 at 75-76; See also Megan Vinett & Todd Jarvis, Conflicts Associated with 
Exempt Wells, JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH & EDUCATION 10, 14 (Aug. 2012). 
 
60 See Sugg & Schlager, supra note 46ch at 137 (noting that “as common pool resources, [groundwater 
basins] are subject to the tragedy of the commons because of the collective effects and actions needed to 
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commonly held resource resembles Hardin’s tragedy of the commons in which limitless 
private use of a limited shared resource will inevitably lead to depletion of that resource 
and the downfall of the community.61 
B. Groundwater Conflict in the Malheur Lake Basin 
 Conflict over available groundwater in the Malheur Lake Basin generally takes 
the form of disputes between senior users with shallow wells and juniors with newer, 
deeper wells.62 Unlike surface water rights holders who may legally “call the river,” a 
senior with a shallow well may not deny access to junior users with deeper wells as this 
would effectively close the aquifer by prohibiting anyone from drilling a well that 
reaches any lower than the water table.63 This “shallow senior” problem poses a risk to 
the transformative potential of conflict where it becomes zero-sum and adversarial. 
Individuals involved in conflicts and disputes over who gets water during scarcity can 
result in administrative hearings, adjudications, and more commonly, in litigation. In the 
context of groundwater disputes, litigation is often considered a viable option since  its 
direct effects are typically considered more proximate than the effects of a depleted 
aquifer, which is still considered to be a far-off, future consequence.64  
                                                                                                                                            
manage groundwater extraction and storage). See also Shiva, supra note 45 at 24 (observing that “water is 
a commons because it is the ecological basis of all life and because its sustainability and equitable 
allocation depend on cooperation among community members). 
 
61 Harney County Watershed Council, supra note 34. 
 
62 See generally House & Graves, supra note 6. 
 
63 Robert Abrams, Legal Convergence of East and West in Contemporary American Water Law, 42 ENV. 
LAW. 65, 73-74 (2012). 
 
64 See Janet Ivey, et al. Community Capacity for Adaptation to Climate-Induced Water Shortages: Linking 
Institutional Complexity and Local Actors, 33 ENVTL. MGMT. 36, 44 (2004) (“planning for collaborative 
adaptation to climate change may strike some municipal and other local water managers as a low priority 
item in the course of their daily duties.”). 
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 It is clear that science is at the core of disputes over groundwater,65 however, 
institutional conflict resolution processes like litigation can be problematic to the extent 
they focus substantially on a singular episode of conflict rather than on the larger scope 
of the conflict and its sources. Attempting to resolve rather than transform a conflict is 
both overly-exclusive and overly-specific to help communities address the short-term and 
long-term needs. Because adversarial procedures of conflict and dispute resolution only 
directly concerns the parties involved, any outcome likewise typically only applies to 
parties rather than to the conflict as an amalgamation of integrated parties and issues.  
 Methods conflict resolution that are adversarial in nature are also problematic at 
an institutional level. Increased water scarcity and drought conditions have given rise to 
more legal action against the State, besieging the OWRD with transactional costs 
associated with an onslaught of water rights adjudications and lawsuits.66 The risk of the 
OWRD overspending its biennial litigation budget is due in part to the increasing 
prevalence of water-related conflicts across the state and is amplified by substantial 
budget cuts made by the Oregon legislature last session.67 Considering these hardships, 
while the threat of litigation certainly incentivizes community and regional action, water 
                                                                                                                                            
 
65 W. Todd Jarvis, Cooperation and Conflict Resolution in Groundwater and Aquifer Management, in 
ADVANCES IN GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE 177, 178 (Villholth et al., eds. 2017). 
 
66 OWRD on Track to Overspend Litigation Budget, HERALD AND NEWS (Mar. 21, 2018) 
https://www.heraldandnews.com/news/local_news/owrd-on-track-to-overspend-litigation-
budget/article_b7058ad6-03ba-5e05-ba90-3edfcc5fc195.html (reporting that the OWRD has already spent 
much of its $835,000 litigation budget, placing it on the road to going $1.3 million over its estimated 2017-
19 budget). 
 
67 Id. at 2. The report alleges that the agency’s budget has fallen from $107.4 million during the 2014-2016 
biennium, to $98.6 million for 2017-2019. See generally OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEP’T, GOVERNOR’S 
2017 –2019 RECOMMENDED BUDGET (2017). 
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rights litigation alone is too particularized and costly to effect long-term, positive change 
for communities reliant on diminishing groundwater resources.68 
                                               
68 See Megdal et al., supra note 43 at 732 (discussing how “[l]ong-standing and new legislation, along with 
litigation or the threat of litigation, continues to drive regional actions” in groundwater management efforts 
in the United States “Sun Belt”.). Megdal also emphasizes the importance of stakeholder engagement in 
groundwater management options. This supports the proposition made here that private litigation (which 
necessarily excludes all but the parties involved) in an inappropriate solution alone for conflicts concerning 
groundwater).  
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CHAPTER V 
EXTENDING THE HAND: COMMUNITY-BASED COLLABORATIVE 
GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE TOOLKIT 
 Acclaimed physicist and human rights activist Vandana Shiva has held that the 
most sustainable way to govern water resources is through local and decentralized 
governance regimes.69 When addressing water security concerns posed by scarcity at a 
local level, it is critical that the governance structure represents the culture, values and 
history of the community in which it will be employed. A governance structure without a 
foundation in the local vernacular will not likely attract the necessary community interest 
or long-term dedication to the process. Because groundwater insecurity has distinctly 
local effects posed by scarcity, local conflict that results must be addressed by the 
affected stakeholders, using locally devised processes to achieve desired outcomes. 
 Because the Malheur Lake Basin is endorheic, groundwater insecurity in the has 
distinctly local effects. The capacity of the Basin to supply a consistent source of water 
therefore has a direct effect on local groundwater users reliant on a predictable supply. 
Because groundwater planning will directly affect the residents within the Basin, laying 
the foundation for a strong groundwater governance structure is a vital precondition for 
groundwater management and the continuation of adaptive processes to a changing 
climate.  
A. Malheur Lake Basin Community-Based Water Planning  
                                               
69 Shiva, supra note 45 at 24 (noting that “because water falls on the earth in a dispersed manner, because 
every living being needs water, decentralized management and democratic ownership are the only efficient, 
sustainable, and equitable systems for the sustenance of all.”). 
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Oregon’s 2012 Integrated Water Resources Strategy (IWRS) proposes a set of 
guidelines meant to encourage this kinds of community-based, flexible groundwater 
governance framework through place-based water planning. The stated goal of place-
based planning is to “allow communities to identify their water resources needs and . . . 
partner with the state to develop solutions and a suit of projects that will help meet those 
needs now and into the future.”70  
Recommendation Action 9A of the IWRS proposes a trial framework and 
provides a set of Draft Guidelines which facilitate collaboration between communities 
and the state on solutions to local water needs.71 The Draft Guidelines also articulate the 
value of pluralistic groundwater governance between state regulators and local 
communities, emphasizing that community support for water resources projects will 
increase community involvement and result more state funding by the state for those 
projects that demonstrate the most community interest.72  
 The Draft Guidelines break down place-based planning into five Planning Steps. 
During Step One, participants work to build a collaborative and integrated process 
through which to identify stakeholders, convene community meetings, define the scale of 
the project area, ensure that the collaborative processes used by the conveners are public 
and transparent and that decisions are made through consensus.73 After identifying 
                                               
70 OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEP’T, Draft Guidelines: A Tool for Conducting Place-Based Integrated 
Water Resources Planning in Oregon 5 (Feb., 2015). 
 
71 OREGON WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION, OREGON’S INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES STRATEGY 
(2017); See Oregon Water Resources Dep’t, Place-Based Planning Updates July–December 2016 (2016) at 
2, http://www.oregon.gov/owrd/docs/Place/UpdatesHandout_DEC2016_PBP_2017JAN01_FINAL.pdf.  
 
72 OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEP’T, supra note 69 at 5. 
 
73 Id. at 7-9. 
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diverse interests and solidifying process, Step Two guides participants to work with the 
OWRD in identifying challenges concerning water resources, water quality and 
ecological issues within the project area.74 Planning Step Three quantifies participants 
existing and future water needs, while Step Four helps participants develop solutions to 
meet long-term water needs.75 Lastly, Step Five provides for the adoption and 
implementation of place-based plans.76 Plans that are approved by the OWRD will be 
integrated into the Oregon Integrated Water Resources Strategy. 
B. Application in the Malheur Lake Basin 
Community-Based Water Planning (CBWP) in the Malheur Lake Basin commenced in 
2016 and is co-convened by the Harney Watershed Council and the Harney County 
Circuit Court, with support from OWRD. The stated goals of the CBWP are to test the 
Draft Guidelines, identify best practices, and recommend how to improve the place-based 
planning process.  
                                               
74 Id. at 9.   
 
75 Id. at 10-15.  
 
76 Id. at 16. 
  
29 
 
Figure 8: IWRS Guiding Principles 
For the duration of the place-based planning pilot, the Malheur Lake Basin CBWP is 
expected to develop a place-based plan in accordance with the Five Planning Steps by 
following the IWRS Guiding Principles listed in Figure 8 above.77 
 The identified purpose of the process employed by the CBWP is to “engage a 
broad, representative group of stakeholders and other interested members of the public to 
begin the process of developing a long-term integrated water resources strategy that will 
meet the needs of Harney County.”78 During Step One, the Harney County Watershed 
Council Coordinating Committee worked to establish this process which laid the 
foundation for sub-committee working groups to address specifically identified areas of 
concern later in the process.79  
                                               
77 Id. at 17. 
 
78 Quarterly Full Collaborative Summary Notes, Harney County Community-Based Water Planning 1 (Jul. 
19, 2017) http://hcwatershedcouncil.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Summary-HC-CBWP-July-19-
2017.pdf.  
 
79 There are presently four Working Groups in the CBWP collaborative – Agriculture, Domestic Well & 
Municipal Water, Ecological, and Vegetation Management. Harney Watershed Council, Harney County 
Community-Based Water Planning Public Planning Session, Meeting Summary/Notes 1 (Jan. 18, 2017) 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxtG96VYSHkCWHVndXM1OG9HU28/view. The Harney Watershed 
Council indicates that a new Working Group focusing on Storage Issues will form early in 2019. HARNEY 
IWRS Guiding Principles 
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 The CBWP identified a number of challenges under Step Two pertaining to water 
in the Malheur Lake Basin. While a number of those challenges exceed the scope of this 
thesis, they are worth noting in full for the sake of full disclosure. The group identified 
that the Basin is challenged by surface water variability which leads to management 
difficulties, as well as by groundwater development which, as explored in detail above, 
has resulted in water table declines and documented shortages in some areas of the 
Basin.80 The group also identified challenges posed to local industries, wildlife and 
migratory birds, and to residents by water scarcity.81 Lastly, the group identified a 
commonly held concern that water use in the Basin is unsustainable and that long-term 
impacts of high water use in the Basin will worsen with the frequency of drought years.82 
 In accordance with Step Three, the CBWP has identified a number of long-term 
goals that will help define the desired water future of the Basin. These goals include 
developing a better understanding of surface water and groundwater in the Basin, 
determining current and future needs for both instream and consumptive use of water, 
and identifying and prioritizing non-regulatory strategies and methods by which to 
achieve these goals.83 By devising these strategies, the CBWP aims to 1) balance water 
uses between diverse needs, 2) promote conservation and water use efficiency, 3) use 
                                                                                                                                            
COUNTY WATERSHED COUNCIL, CBWP Meetings & Materials (last visited on May 23, 2018) 
http://hcwatershedcouncil.com/cbwp-meeting-materials/.  
 
80 HARNEY COUNTY WATERSHED COUNCIL, Community-Based Water Planning (last visited on May 23, 
2018) http://hcwatershedcouncil.com/community-based-water-planning/.  
 
81 Id. 
 
82 Id. 
 
83 Id. 
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water efficiently by maximizing use, and 4) ensure water quality and quantity within the 
Basin.84  
 The full CBWP collaborative group meets quarterly to discuss accomplishments 
and next steps. Moreover, results from the USGS groundwater study trickling in to the 
OWRD’s Groundwater Study Advisory Committee which is working with the CBWP 
Coordinating Committee to ensure that the processes and governance decisions made by 
the group are science-based and flexible as urged by the IWRS Guiding Principles.85 
C. Critique: Why Community-Based Collaborative Processes are Necessary 
but Insufficient  
  Just as arguments exist that prior appropriation is inappropriate for efficient 
groundwater allocation, some suggest that collaborative governance processes –without 
more– are ill-suited to natural resources management because of their propensity to 
magnify stakeholder participatory inequalities, preclude true collaboration, and limit the 
potential for consensus.86 However, groundwater governance as understood as a means of 
conflict transformation does not emphasize an absence of conflict as the desired outcome, 
and therefore does not compromise the integrity of change processes in its pursuit of 
placating stakeholders through consensus.87 
 The literature suggests that community-based governance solutions, while 
necessary to long-term positive change, are effectively toothless without engaging with 
                                               
84 Id. 
 
85 See Figure 8 supra 28. 
 
86 TRACYLEE CLARKE & TARLA RAI PETERSON, ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 20 (Matthew 
Byrnie, Ollivia Weber-Stenis & Elizabeth Swearngin, eds. 2016). 
 
87 Id. (referencing Peterson et al. (2005)). 
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state enforcement mechanisms.88 The resilience of groundwater governance structures to 
external change hinges on the extent of stakeholder involvement, although stakeholder 
involvement alone does not guarantee success. Rather, in order to ensure that a 
governance model is tailored to the needs and interests of a community or basin, it must 
possess the necessary procedural qualities to lend predictability to conflict 
transformation. 
 
                                               
88 Robert Varady, et al., Modes and Approaches of Groundwater Governance: A survey of Lessons Learned 
from Selected Cases Across the Globe, 8 WATER 417, 419 (SEPT. 23, 2016)  (recognizing that water 
specifically requires direct participation from both local stakeholders and governmental regulatory entities, 
and that giving full responsibility to communities to govern and manage groundwater more often than not 
ends in failure). 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE HAMMER AND THE HAND: PLURALISTIC GROUNDWATER 
GOVERNANCE AS A HARBINGER FOR CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 
 American jurist and lawyer Lee Loevinger observed that an expert of any 
discipline will confront a conflict believing that his or her specialized skill set is the only 
means of resolving the issue.89 Where water conflict is concerned then, it is unsurprising 
that lawmakers laud regulatory solutions and many communities, particularly those in 
rural agricultural areas, defend the their right to localized governance of natural 
resources. However, conflicting opinions on the appropriate scale at which to govern and 
manage groundwater support the proposition that top-down and bottom-up governance 
methods are more effective when utilized together. Just as the hammer and the skilled 
hand construct a stronger structure together than separately, so do local governance 
regimes when enforced by the hammer of state regulation.90 
 By combining the strengths of community-based solutions with legal and 
regulatory tools, communities can enjoy the benefit of their collaborative efforts while 
relying upon the security of existing state legal and regulatory frameworks to enforce 
governance strategies that are distinctly tailored to that community’s unique needs and 
desired outcomes. Furthermore, a community-based groundwater governance framework 
will encourage conservation through efficient use of groundwater resources in closed 
                                               
89 Loevinger adopted for politics Maslow’s widely used adage that “if the only tool you have is a hammer . 
. .  treat everything as if it were a nail.” ABRAHAM MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 15–16 (Harper 
& Row 1969). 
 
90 See A.M. Duda, Leadership and Political Will for Groundwater Governance: Indispensable for Meeting 
the New Sustainable Development Goals, in ADVANCES IN GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE 99, 109 
(Villholth et al., eds. 2017). (arguing that “only place-based, integrated approaches . . .  combined with 
sector reforms [such as water pricing] will work”). 
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basins such as the Malheur Lake Basin, while contributing to a healthful judicial 
economy by mitigating or resolving water conflicts preemptively.91  
 This section provides a comparative analysis of three similarly situated 
communities in Kansas, Colorado, and Utah, and demonstrates how each has navigated 
actual and perceived barriers to localized groundwater governance. Each case study was 
chosen based on similarities in water law, common agricultural use, and conflict 
surrounding overallocation and overuse of groundwater resources. The purpose of this 
analysis is to provide examples and note best practices by tracing processes of similarly 
situated communities that have attempted to address groundwater problems by integrating 
place-based planning with state enforcement mechanisms. 
A. A Comparative Analysis of Case Studies from Colorado, Utah, and 
Kansas 
1. Voluntary Fee Agreements in the San Luis Basin, Colorado 
 As in many western states, demand for groundwater in Colorado has grown more 
abundant than the water supply. Additional stress factors accompanying severe drought 
and the pressure to put water to beneficial use has put pressure on Colorado’s water and 
groundwater supplies, particularly in the Rio Grande Basin’s San Luis Valley.92 While 
the water rights allocation systems in Colorado and Oregon differ slightly, hydrological 
and agricultural use similarities between the San Luis Valley and the Malheur Lake Basin 
                                               
91 The Oregon Water Resources Department is currently on-track to overspend its litigation budget for the 
2017-2019 biennium. While most of the litigation costs are related to water rights conflicts in the Klamath 
Basin, the frequency of water rights litigation against the OWRD rights is likely to increase in the future if 
conflict is not prevented at a community level. Herald and News, OWRD on Track to Overspend Litigation 
Budget, HERALD AND NEWS (Mar. 21, 2018) https://www.heraldandnews.com/news/local_news/owrd-on-
track-to-overspend-litigation-budget/article_b7058ad6-03ba-5e05-ba90-3edfcc5fc195.html.  
 
92 Colorado Water Conservation Board, Water Supply Planning, http://cwcb.state.co.us/water-
management/water-supply-planning/Pages/main.aspx. 
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make the voluntary imposition of groundwater use fees in Sub-District 1 an applicable 
case study for groundwater users in the Malheur Lake Basin. 
 In order to prevent state regulators from shutting down well operations in the San 
Luis Basin collaborated with farm owners to create the Basin’s first sub-district in 2006. 
The San Luis Basin “sub-district project” was undertaken by Sub-District 1 in 2012 in 
response to irrigators’ continuous reliance on groundwater resources. Rather than 
succumbing to a tragedy of the commons, irrigators within the Sub-District collectively 
devised a groundwater use scheme which allows irrigators within the sub-district to pay 
$75 per AF of groundwater used.93  
 The sub-district project requires irrigators to choose how they will restrict their 
water consumption, between paying a usage fee or fallowing a portion of their land. 
While there are several options given to irrigators, the sub-district model provides local 
irrigators an opportunity to determine conservation methods that are tailored to specific 
characteristics and needs of one particular sub-basin. Funds collected through self-
imposed fee arrangements compensate irrigators that opt to keep marginal areas fallow 
rather than pay the $75 per AF fee.  
 Although the sub-district project began slowly, it has since demonstrated success 
and the aquifer has recovered almost 250,000 feet of water since 2012.94 Conservation 
measures have resulted in 10,000 acres of land left fallow of the 40,000-acre goal to be 
                                               
93 Lisa Marshall, When Farmers Must Pay for Groundwater, They Cut Use by a Third, CU BOULDER 
TODAY 2 (Jun. 22, 2017) https://www.colorado.edu/today/2017/06/22/when-farmers-must-pay-
groundwater-they-cut-use-third.  
 
94 Paige Blankenburger, After years of drought and overuse, the San Luis Valley aquifer refills, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS (May 26, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/articles/after-years-of-drought-and-overuse-a-
water-basin-refills-in-the-san-luis-valley. 
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reached by 2021.95 As of 2016, groundwater pumping in the San Luis Valley had 
decreased to 200,000 AF from 320,000 AF in 2015.96   
 The voluntary fee arrangement model has been touted as a successful example of 
community-based groundwater governance, although it was the subject of some litigation 
coming from individuals adverse both to state water regulations and the community-
based response.97 Despite the threat of litigation, a locally-devised groundwater 
management plan will typically enjoy a presumption of validity by the courts.98 
Notwithstanding treatment by the courts, threat of litigation represents a deficiency in the 
relational sphere of conflict transformation and emphasizes the necessity of ensuring 
every stakeholder has an opportunity to participate.  
2. State Delegation of Authority to Local Groups in the Grand Escalante 
Valley, Utah 
 In Utah’s Escalante Valley, groundwater users are looking at a long-term 
groundwater management strategy. Rather than subject themselves to regulatory 
interference by the state, groundwater users in the Valley, most of whom are agricultural 
irrigators, organized to create the Escalante Valley Water Users (EVWU) association to 
devise a management plan to help users minimize the effects of  groundwater mining in 
the Valley. 
                                               
95 Id. 
 
96 Id. 
 
97 San Antonio v. Special Improvement District No.1, 270 P.3d 927 (Colo. 2011).  
 
98 Id. at 940.  
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 Like the Malheur Lake Basin, groundwater in the Grand Escalante Valley has 
been overallocated and overused.99 In response to conflict over how and when to taper 
groundwater use in the Valley, the EVWU and Utah state legislators devised a bill (SB-
20) that transferred the power of groundwater management from the state engineer to 
local groups.100 Since the passage of SB-20 in 2007, the EVWU has faced economic 
barriers to groundwater user reduction based on the agricultural projects sustained by 
groundwater that fuel the regional economy.  
 In order the soften the economic impact of the Bill on the agricultural economy, 
EVWU proposed stretching out the timeframe for use reductions, possibly by a mere five 
percent every twenty-year period.101 While this poses a palatable solution to the 
economic barriers of groundwater use reduction, it poses another problem regarding time: 
at the proposed rate, groundwater users in the Escalante Valley will continue mining the 
aquifer for another 180 years.  
3. Incentivized Reduction in Groundwater use through Local Enhanced 
Management Areas in Sheridan County, Kansas 
 In 1972, the Kansas legislature adopted the Kansas Groundwater Management 
District Act.102 The Act and its subsequent amendments provide for the establishment of 
Intensive Groundwater Use Control Areas by either water rights owners, the 
Groundwater Management District, or the Chief Engineer. In 2013, Governor Sam 
                                               
99 Jamie Hansen, It Takes a District: Utah Landowners Control Groundwater Use, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS 4 
(May 10, 2010) https://www.hcn.org/issues/42.8/it-takes-a-district. 
 
100 Id. 
 
101 Id. at 5. 
 
102 K.S.A. 82a-1020 – 1042 Groundwater Management District Act (Jul. 2017). 
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Brownback called for a statewide Kansas Water Vision to “[p]rovide Kansans with the 
framework, policy, and tools, developed in concert with stakeholders, to manage, secure, 
and protect a reliable, long term statewide water supply while balancing conservation 
with economic growth.”103  
 In response to groundwater depletion across the state, the Groundwater 
Management District Act included a provision introducing Local Enhanced Management 
Areas (LEMAs), which provide a voluntary, procedural framework for communities to 
govern and regulate groundwater usage.104 While the framework is provided by statute, 
groundwater regulation itself is devised locally. Once an irrigation district has devised a 
groundwater management plan, the plan is submitted for review and, pending approval, is 
enforced by the state. Community participation is voluntary, and the role of state 
regulators is limited to the review process, order implementation, and enforcement. 
Proposed orders that are created at a community level are submitted to the Chief Engineer 
for approval where they are subject to both administrative and judicial review if 
challenged. 
 The state approved is first LEMA in 2012 in order to extend the life of the 
Ogallala aquifer. The LEMA applied to groundwater users in parts of Sheridan and 
Thomas Counties in Northwestern Kansas and is collectively known as the Sheridan 6 
(SD-6) LEMA. Local stakeholders in Sheridan used collaborative processes to generate 
the Sheridan 6 LEMA proposal before the Senate Bill providing for a LEMA option had 
                                               
103 STATE OF KANSAS, A LONG-TERM VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF WATER SUPPLY IN KANSAS (2015). 
https://kwo.ks.gov/docs/default-source/water-vision-water-
plan/vision/rpt_water_vision_reformatted_kf1d56e11da40b6667970cff000032a16e.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
 
104 K.S.A 82a-1041. 
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even been codified. The proposal indicates a collective agreement that “[a]ll water 
diversions within the SD-6 area to be collectively restricted . . . to no more than 114,000 
[AF] total.”105 The proposal included a defined expiration of the LEMA in 2017, but 
upon review, the Chief Engineer approved a proposal to extend the Sheridan 6 LEMA for 
the years 2018-2022.106 
 Actual implementation of water conservation measures in the Sheridan 6 LEMA 
has been slow due to a number of factors acting as barriers to preventing aquifer 
depletion. First, as with groundwater supplies in the Malheur Lake Basin, groundwater in 
the Ogallala Aquifer has been over-allocated and aquifer depletion far outpaces renewal. 
Moreover, the State is apprehensive about implementing top-down mandatory restrictions 
on groundwater use because of potential “takings” issues stemming from the United 
States and Kansas Constitutions.107 Lastly, a top-down method for restricting use may 
prompt large irrigators that tend to dominate membership and hold considerable political 
clout in Groundwater Management Districts to retaliate politically.108 
 While it may still be too early to determine the overall success of the LEMA 
project, current data is promising. As of May, 2018, the Sheridan 6 LEMA and 
                                               
105 Sheridan District 6 HPA Stakeholders Proposal to be Recommended to the Northwest Kansas 
Groundwater Management District No. 4 Board of Directors Along with a Request that Said Proposal be 
Adopted by the Groundwater Management District 4 Board and Submitted to the Chief Engineer, Kansas 
Dep’t, Ag., Div. of Water Resources as a LEMA Proposal 1 (June 15, 2012) 
http://www.gmd4.org/SD6/SD6-EnhancedMgtPlan-V2.pdf. 
 
106 Kansas Dep’t of Agriculture, Sheridan County 6 LEMA (Aug. 24, 2017) 
http://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-kansas-water-resources/local-enhanced-
management-areas/sheridan-county-6-lema. 
 
107 Burke Griggs, Lessons from Kansas: A More Sustainable Groundwater Management Approach, 
STANFORD: WATER IN THE WEST (August 18, 2014), http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/news-
events/news-press-releases/lessons-kansas-more-sustainable-groundwater-management-approach. 
 
108 Id. 
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Groundwater Management District 4 District-Wide LEMA are the only active LEMAs in 
Kansas.109 However, Groundwater Management District Number Five has since proposed 
the Rattlesnake/Quivira LEMA, which is currently undergoing review.110 
B. Takeaways for the Malheur Lake Basin CBWP 
 Although each case study above differs from the Malheur Lake Basin CBWP in 
fundamental ways, valuable lessons may be extracted from each and are illustrated in 
Table 1 below: 
Table 1: Best Practices and Barriers to Groundwater Security 
 
 
 First, an issue experienced by stakeholders in all three case studies concerned the 
length of time between the initiation of a change process and the estimated realization of 
                                               
109 Kansas Dep’t of Agriculture, Current Local Enhanced Management Areas (LEMAs) (last accessed Apr. 
30, 2018) http://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-kansas-water-resources/local-
enhanced-management-areas. 
 
110 Kansas Dep’t of Agriculture, GMD5 Rattlesnake/Quivira LEMA (last accessed May. 23, 2018) 
http://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-kansas-water-resources/local-enhanced-
management-areas/gmd5-rattlesnake-quivira-lema.  
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the desired outcome. Particularly in the case of the Grand Escalante Valley, which for all 
their efforts will not likely see their desired outcome for nearly two centuries. 
 The CBWP will need to assess its desired timeframe – one which will likely be 
influenced by the new data produced by the USGS study when it concludes in 2020. 
Discouragement produced by a long timeframe can place a group on Lederach’s circle of 
change at the point where “things collapse.”111 It will be important at this stage to 
maintain equilibrium between relations, change processes and the ability to view conflict 
as an opportunity in order to continue through the collapse and transform into forward 
motion. 
 Second, it should consider the potential consequences of increased state 
regulatory presence in the Basin. An important takeaway from the SD-6 LEMA case 
study is that even voluntary conservation that is vetted by the state may come with 
potential concerns under constitutional takings. However, it does also indicate that the 
state stands to benefit greatly from pluralistic governance of groundwater resources. 
Devising a process locally reduces the takings potential of groundwater conservation, 
while similarly reducing the likelihood of political retribution. 
 Third, while community-based solutions to local problems will generally prove 
less litigious due to robust stakeholder engagement in the process, the Sub-District 1 case 
study provides an example that litigation is always an option. Although voluntary 
groundwater management plans may become subject to judicial or administrative review, 
this risk should not be viewed as a deterring factor but as an opportunity to produce a 
                                               
111 Figure 7 at 16. 
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governance structure that includes diverse interests and promotes long-term groundwater 
security. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RECOMMENDATIONS: TRANSFORMING A TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS 
INTO AN OPPORTUNITY FOR POSITIVE CHANGE 
 If understood as an ongoing process for positive change, groundwater governance 
can provide a robust mechanism for groundwater security in the Malheur Lake Basin that 
will ensure conflicts arising around groundwater and water resources in the Basin in 
general will continue to transform once state support for the CBWP is no longer 
available. The importance of building local capacity within the CBWP to facilitate 
transformative, positive change through a circular process is immeasurable and also 
requires legal and regulatory enforcement to be seen as a viable, long-term groundwater 
governance framework.  
A. Intersections 
 In order to devise a transformational, pluralistic groundwater governance 
structure, CBWP participants should consider stakeholder relations, stakeholders’ 
abilities to view conflict as an opportunity, and creative change processes within the 
unique context of the Basin. While the stakeholders represented in Figure 9 below are not 
exhaustive, the Figure itself represents a visual application of relevant stakeholders and 
creative change process that are likely necessary to affect desired outcomes in the Basin.  
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Figure 9: Conflict Transformation Intersection as Applied to CBWP 
 The entities associated with the blue circle represent stakeholders that must be 
included in each step of the process. The purple circle containing creative change 
processes represents the importance of considering both desired processes and those 
processes that may have been inadvertently created as a result of the conflict. These 
processes are essential to achieving identified outcomes and group objectives, and are 
evaluated within the context of the Malheur Lake Basin below. The ability for 
stakeholders and interested parties to view conflict as an opportunity is a critical link and 
is represented by the green circle. Maintaining the relational context such that conflict is 
viewed as an opportunity enables stakeholders to assess both positive and negative 
processes associated with the conflict and determine whether to alter or create processes 
that will move the conflict in a positive direction.    
 
B. Creative Change Processes 
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 As seen by the case study analysis above, creative change processes might take 
what some may consider an unreasonable amount of time to achieve their intended result. 
Therefore, in order to ensure current and future water rights are met in the Basin in a 
timely manner, stakeholders might consider two potential outcomes: Reduce use of the 
basin’s waters until the completion of the USGS groundwater study in 2020, or augment 
supply through inter-basin transfer of water resources. These two options and 
considerations are illustrated in Figure 10 below. 
 
Figure 10: Short-Term Considerations for the Malheur Lake Basin's Water Future 
 
1. Reduce Demand 
 In order to increase water security in the Malheur Lake Basin, one objective for 
consideration is reducing demand for water. Irrigators in Basin have already begun 
changing their irrigation techniques from high-volume irrigation such as center pivot to 
low-flow techniques like drip irrigation. Low-flow irrigation techniques enable irrigators 
to produce the same output by using water more efficiently, presenting the opportunity 
for conservation of groundwater that would have otherwise been consumed.  
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 As demonstrated by the case studies above, local incentives to reduce water use 
and promote efficient irrigation practices can be devised locally and given enforcement 
power by the state. However, there is some concern amongst rights holders that voluntary 
conservation of their groundwater could result in forfeiture of all or part of their water 
right for non-use. While these concerns are valid under prior appropriation’s tradition of 
valuing water for its consumptive over non-consumptive use, there are two avenues 
described below under which groundwater rights will likely not be forfeited should the 
rights holder engage in voluntary conservation. Two such regulatory avenues in Oregon 
state law are described below, which facilitate voluntary conservation through aquifer 
storage and recovery and voluntary groundwater agreements. 
a. Aquifer Storage and Recovery 
 As described above, extreme climate variability112 has created a sort of 
conservation conundrum for groundwater users in the Malheur Lake Basin interested in 
conserving waters associated with their permitted groundwater right but worry that 
waters saved through voluntary conservation may be viewed as grounds for forfeiture. 
Fortunately, aquifer storage and recovery (ASR) projects satisfy Oregon’s beneficial use 
requirement on the premise that water “conservation . . . benefits all water users, provides 
water to satisfy current and future needs through reduction of consumptive waste, 
improves water quality be reducing contaminated return flow, prevents erosion and 
allows increased in-stream flow.”113 ASR allows groundwater supplies to be stored in a 
                                               
112 See Daniel Swain, Baird Langenbrunner, J.David Neelin & Alex Hall, Increasing Precipitation 
Volatility in Twenty-First-Century California, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1-10 (2018), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0140-y.pdf. (using the term climate “whiplash” to describe the 
detrimental effects of extreme weather variations on California’s water supply". 
 
113 OR. REV. STAT. §537.460(1)(2017). 
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reservoir prior to beneficial use as long as the groundwater right allows for storage and 
the reservoirs don’t interfere with surface water supplies.114 
 All ASR projects require a permit, which the state will grant after the applicant 
conducts a test project that ensures a baseline quality and quantity of the injection source 
water and the water in the receiving aquifer.115 If granted, an ASR project has the 
capacity to increase water security within the basin by storing water below ground where 
evaporation does not pose a threat to the stored supply. 
b. Voluntary Groundwater Agreements 
 Oregon law provides another avenue for groundwater conservation through 
voluntary groundwater agreements. In 2015 Oregon’s Legislative Assembly passed a 
statutory framework for voluntary, community-based governance of groundwater 
resources in response to the Governor’s emergency drought order. Codified at ORS 
537.745, the voluntary groundwater agreements statute allows groundwater users from 
the same groundwater reservoir to form voluntary agreements recognized by the Water 
Resources Commission.116 These agreements are valid so long as they are executed in 
writing, filed with the commission and consistent with applicable state law.117 Once 
acknowledged by the OWRC, the voluntary agreement controls groundwater 
                                                                                                                                            
 
114 Oregon law allows for aquifer storage and recovery projects that are permitted by the OWRD. Prior to 
being issued a permit to engage in a permanent storage and recovery project, a person is required to first 
apply for a limited license to complete a test program to ensure the project does not cause injury. OR. REV. 
STAT. 537.534 (2017). 
 
115 NEUMAN, supra note 49 at 100. 
 
116 OR. REV. STAT. § 537.745 (2017). 
 
117 Voluntary Agreements must be consistent with OR. REV. STAT §§ 537.505-795 (2017). 
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management within the reservoir to which it applies, “in lieu of a formal order or rule of 
the commission”.118  
 In passing ORS 537.745, the Oregon Legislature intended to provide local 
groundwater users with a procedural alternative to natural resource regulation by the 
state,119 but lack of funding and concern surrounding inadvertent forfeiture have made the 
framework provided by ORS 537.745 difficult for communities to engage with. That the 
legislation itself is a reactionary measure to the 2015 drought demonstrates the 
importance for communities to be proactive in how they adapt to water scarcity. 
2. Augment Supply Through Transfer  
 In addition to decreasing demand for water resources within the Basin through 
increased efficiency and voluntary agreements, another alternative entails augmenting the 
current supply of water in the Basin through inter-basin transfer. Until relatively recently, 
the legal right to use groundwater was attached to the ownership of overlying property in 
accordance with the English Common Law doctrine of absolute ownership.120 However, 
it is now possible to separate a water right from the appurtenant land through a transfer 
                                               
118 Id.; OR. REV. STAT. §537.515(6)(2017) (defining the term “groundwater reservoir” as “a designated 
body of standing or moving ground water having exterior boundaries which may be ascertained or 
reasonably inferred.”) 
 
119 The statute “clearly express[es] an overall public policy and interest in controlling the appropriation of 
ground water and set[s] forth a uniform system to effectuate that policy. Although the statute vests 
considerable authority in the director to establish rules . . . the statutory and regulatory scheme cannot be 
read as expressly prohibiting local bodies from engaging in regulatory activity of their own that is not 
inconsistent with the statute or agency regulations.”[emphasis in original]   of Oregon, By and Through the 
Water Resources Department v. City of Klamath Falls 68 Or. App. 148, 785; 682 P.2d 779 (1984). 
 
120 Charalambous, supra note 46 at 60-62. 
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process that is administered and regulated by the state. This is a relatively common 
practice for municipalities and agricultural projects situated in water scarce locations.121  
 When applying for a water rights transfer permit, the applicant must assess 
potential harm or “injury” that the change may cause to existing rights holders and show 
that the transfer will not result in injury to those rights.122 However, given the importance 
of injury-prevention, the OWRD has a surprisingly limited123 approach to injury 
assessment, using an unstandardized, subjective process to quantify potential injury from 
water rights transfers.124 Koda proposes using an actuarial science method of injury 
quantification to reduce perceived risk posed by transfers and increase the quantity of 
accurate water rights data across the state. Simplifying  the job of state water masters by 
standardizing the injury quantification process through actuarial scientific methods would 
effectively remove subjectivity from the current analysis and increase certainty to support 
efficient use of Oregon’s waters.125  
                                               
121 Interstate water transfer agreements, while beyond the scope of this project, are far from perfect and 
consistently require room for flexibility and renegotiation as to the capacity of the Colorado River to 
provide a sustainable source of freshwater, particularly during times of drought. Henry Brean, States 
Consider More Cuts on Colorado River to Prop Up Lake Mead, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Apr. 26, 
2016) https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/states-consider-more-cuts-on-colorado-river-to-
prop-up-lake-mead/ (reporting that in order to slow the decline of Lake Mead and Lake Powell, states 
including Arizona and California that rely on the Colorado River must negotiate use reductions in order to 
adapt to increasingly arid regional conditions). 
 
122 Although the term “injury” is not defined by statute and is only mentioned briefly in the Oregon 
Administrative Rules governing transfer (Or. Admin. R.690-380-0100(3)), Rick Bastasch provides the 
following definition, which is useful here: “A statutorily undefined adverse impact to existing water right 
holders that must be guarded against in issuing new water rights or approving transfers.” Bastasch, supra 
note 31 at 341. See also Neuman supra note 49 at 197. 
 
123 Bastasch, supra note 31 at 90. 
 
124 Keely Koda, Analysis of Water Right Transfers and Injury Quantification in a Prior Appropriation 
System – A Perspective from Actuarial Mathematics (August 9, 2007) (unpublished Honors B.S. thesis, 
Oregon State University) (on file with the University Honors College, Oregon State University). 
 
125 Id. 
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C. Opportunities for Further Research 
 The accuracy of the conclusions and recommendations proposed in this thesis are 
contingent upon the USGS groundwater study findings and results. Disclosure of the full 
set of data collected by the USGS over the course of this study will open up avenues for 
further research on groundwater governance structures and potentials for groundwater 
management in the Basin. Increased data will also help forthcoming research on the 
quality of water in the Basin and how to best minimize the effects of arsenic and nitrate 
levels in the water.  
 Another opportunity for further research concerns the effect that the Malheur 
Wildlife Refuge has on planning efforts. The quality and quantity of water flowing to the 
wetlands housed within the refuge is a variable that is imperative to long-term water 
resources governance and management within the Basin. Because the wetlands are 
situated on the Pacific Flyway and provide habitat for a variety of birds, mammals, fish, 
and amphibians, it will be interesting to see the effect that groundwater mining has on the 
wetlands and whether lack of water or degraded water quality triggers claims under the 
Migratory Bird Act, the Endangered Species Act, of the Clean Water Act.  
 Lastly, there is room for further research on any potential tribal claims to the 
Basin’s groundwater that may be brought by the Burns Paiute Tribe should over-
extraction within the Basin continue. To date, no claims have been raised as to the legal 
water rights held by the Burns Paiute Tribe, nor by federal agencies with regard to federal 
water rights connected to Malheur Lake and the species which rely on the wetlands 
located within the Malheur Wildlife Refuge. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 As state support for the place-based planning pilot draws to an end in July 2019, it 
will be essential for the positive progress made during the project to continue to 
transform and address short-term conflicts as they arise while progressing towards long-
term, systemic change in the Basin’s water future. Effective management of a dynamic 
resource like groundwater requires a strong governance structure that is dynamic in equal 
measure. The place-based planning framework provided in Oregon’s Integrated Water 
Resources Strategy with support from the OWRD provides the CBWP with such a 
dynamic and flexible framework for pluralistic groundwater governance in the Malheur 
Lake Basin.  
 Just like the hammer and the hand, the integration of state and local groundwater 
governance processes can transform conflict and build a secure groundwater future the 
for the Basin. This integration of top-down and bottom-up governance has the capacity to 
speak to local needs while enjoying the security of state enforcement. When viewed 
through the lens of conflict transformation, this pluralist governance structure is the most 
appropriate for governing groundwater resources for its ability to adapt to changing 
circumstances. 
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